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Abstract
The creation ofthe euro will link an economy that is nearly as large and as open as the
United States. Does this imply that the euro will rival the role of the dollar as an
international currency? This paperaddressesthis question through an examination ofthe
determinants oftheuse of an international currency. It examines both the prospects of
the euro becoming an internationalcurrency and the implications for theEuropeanUnion
andthe United States.
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The final stagein the creationofthe Europeaneconomic and monetary union (EMU)
will entailthe replacementofthe nationalcurrencies ofthe member stateswith a single currency
-- the euro. This event, which is unparalleled historically, is likely to producethe greatest
potential rival to the dollarin international currencymarkets sincethe dollar deposed the pound
as thepre-eminent internationalcurrency. This paperexamines the potential role ofthe euro as
international currencythrough an analysis ofthe functionsofan internationalcurrency.
Economists definemoney as anything which serves the followingthreefunctions: a unit
ofaccount, a store ofvalueand a mediumofexchange. To operate as a unitofaccount, prices
must be set in termsofthe money. To functionas a storeofvalue, the purchasingpower of
moneymust not deteriorate over time.’ To function as a medium ofexchange, the money must
be used forpurchasing goods and services. Clearly, an international moneymust also serve these
threefunctions. For an international currency,one usedoutsideits countryofissue, these
functions are generallydecomposedby sectorofuse -- official and private, as in Table ~
Acurrency serves asan internationalcurrencyforofficial purposes ifit is usedas an
official exchange rate peg,ifgovernments and/orcentralbanks hold foreign exchange reserves in
this currency, and ifit is used asan interventioncurrency. An international currencyforprivate
transactions must functionas an invoice currency,financial assets must be denominated in this
This is the most difficultrole for currencyto achieve. Nevertheless it is a key function
fordeterminingifa currency willfunction as money. In countries experiencinghyperinflation
thereis both an increase in the useofbarterand the useofa foreigncurrency fortransactions
purposes.
2 This analysisofthe three functions ofmoney by sector ofuse, which is widely used in
the literature, was first adoptedby Cohen (1971).
1currency and itmust be used as a vehiclecurrencythrough which two othercurrencies are traded.
An internationalcurrency may also become a substitute currency fora domestic currency. In this
caseitserves all three functions: unitofaccount, store ofvalue and medium ofexchange.
Generally, a substitute currencyis usedwhenhigh inflation orpolitical instability eliminate the






Unit ofAccount Exchange RatePeg Invoice
Store ofValue Reserves Financial Assets
MediumofExchange Intervention Vehicle
The threefunctions ofan international currencyreinforce each other. Forexample, if a
countrypegs its exchange rateto anothercurrency, it is likely to hold reserves in that currency
and conduct its interventions in exchange markets in that currency. Onthe private side, the use
ofa currencyforinvoicing trade and holdingfinancial assetsincreases theprobabilitythat the
currencywill be usedas a vehiclecurrency. Theuseofa currency forinternationalprivate
transactions also reinforces its use in official transactions.
The use ofa currency in theinternational exchange ofgoods, services and assets
determines its role as a global currency. Thus, thelarger and moreopen an economy is the more
likely its currency is to circulate in international markets. Size and openness in part determine a
country’s share ofglobal trade and are also important in determiningthe size ofa country’s
capital markets.
The convertibilityofa country’s currency is another importantdeterminant ofits usein
international markets. Restrictions on the ability to exchange a currencyforothercurrencies
2willlimit its global use. At the end ofWorldWarIIalmost every country,with theexception of
theU.S., restrictedthe convertibility ofits currency. This inconvertibility persisted forthefirst
decade followingthe end ofthe war. The convertibilityofthe U.S. dollarprompted its useas the
currencyin whichinternational tradewasconducted. The overall strength and stabilityofthe
U.S. economyWerealso importantfactors in promoting the dollar’suseas an international
currency.
The growthofthe German and Japanese economies and therelativeprice stability
achievedby thesecountries haspromptedthe useoftheircurrencies in international markets. As
a result, theoverwhelming dominancethedollarheld in international markets in the 1950s and
l960s is diminishing. Neverthelessthe dollarremains themost importantinternationalcurrency.
Partlythis is due to the importanceofinertia in determiningtrends in the useofcurrencies in
international markets. Forexample, the pound sterling continued to playa majorrole as an
international currencylong afterits dominance ofthe global economyhad waned. The dominant
position ofthe U.S. dollaras an international currency in the earlypost-warperiod has in part
sustained its use as an internationalcurrency as its relative economicpower has declined.
Another factor favoring thecontinued use ofthe U.S. dollar is the size,depth, and liquidity of
U.S. financialmarkets relative to tt~ose in Germanyand Japan.
The creationofthe euro will be a major eventin international financialhistory. Ifall the
current members oftheEuropeanUnion join the EMU the single currencywill link an economy
that is nearly as large as theUnited States and significantly larger than the economyofJapan, see
Table 2. Likewise the share ofworldexports ofthe European Union (excluding intra-E.U. trade)
is only slightly below the share ofthe United States and more than doubleJapan’s share. Do
these factors imply that theeuro will rival therole ofthe dollaras an international currency?
3Table 2
Comparison ofU.S., E.U. and JapaneseEconomies --1996
U.S. E.U. Japan
Share ofWorld GDP (%) 20.7 20.4 8.0
Share ofWorld Exports (%) 15.2 14.7 6.1
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook, October 1997.
This paper addressesthis question through an examination ofthe recent trends in and the
determinants ofthe useofinternational currencies foreachofthefunctions listed in Table 1.
Furthermore,itconsiders theprospects that theeuro will playa major role in eachofthe
functions and examines the implications of thesechanges forboth the European Union and the
United States.
The OfficialUses ofan International Currency
Exchange RatePeg
Countries thatpeg theirexchange rateto anothercurrencymost often choose the U.S.
dollar. At the end of 1975, fifty-twocurrencies were peggedto the dollar,as shown in Table 3.
The French francwas the second most popular choice.3 No currencies were peggedto the
Deutschemark orthe Japanese yen. Combining all ofthe currencies pegged to the currencies of
the current members oftheEuropeanUnion still leftthedollaras the predominantchoice foran
exchange ratepeg. By theend of 1996, the number ofcurrencies pegged to the dollarhad
~ The French franc is usedas thecurrencypeg forthe member countriesofthe African
Financial Community (CFA).
4declined to twenty-one. The French franc wasstill thesecond most popularchoice, with the








1975 52 13 02 2
1980 39 14 0 16
1985 31 14 0 15
1990 25 14 1 15
1996 21 14 2 17
The declinein the numberofcurrencies tied to thedollar since 1975 is a resultofa
decline in the popularity of fixed exchange rates rather than ashift away from the dollar. None
of the currencies that were tied to the dollar in 1975 have chosen anothercurrency for apeg.
Moreover, while most countries no longer claim to pegtheir exchange rate many do limit the
flexibility of their currencies against the dollar. Sixty-two countries explicitly limit the flexibility
oftheir currencies against the dollar, far more thanagainst any other currency.4
Table 3
Currency Pegs
Countries currently pegging theircurrency to thedollar: Angola, Antigua &
Barbuda, Argentina, the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dijbouti,Dominica, Grenada,
Iraq, Liberia, Lithuania, Marshall Islands,Federated States ofMicronesia, Nigeria,
Oman, Panama, St. Kitts & Nevis, St. Lucia, StVincent and the Grenadines, Syrian
Arab Republic.
Countries currently pegging their currencytothe franc: Benin, BurkinaFaso,
Cameroon, Central AfricanRepublic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Côte d’Ivoire,
Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Mali,Niger, Senegal, Togo.
Countries currently pegging their currencyto theDM: Bosnia and Herzegovina, and
Estonia.
Source: IMF, Exchange Arrangementsand Exchange Restrictions, various years.
IMF (1996).
5Themajorfactors which influence the choice ofacurrency for an exchange rate peg are
theextent ofa country’s tradeand financiallinks with thecountry whose currency is chosen for
the peg. Countriesthat areheavily dependent on tradein commodities arelikely to choose the
dollarifthey peg theirexchange rate since most internationallytradedcommodities arepriced in
dollars. In choosing a currencypeg the stabilityoftheprospective peg is also important. A high
inflationcountrymay choose to peg its exchange rateas a means to restrict the growth rate ofits
money supply.
The creationofthe euro is unlikely to causecountries that currently peg to the dollarto
switch to the euro, with thepossible exception ofLithuania. Forthe most partthecountries
whosecurrencies are peggedto thedollar arecountries whose economies are linked to theU.S.
(countriesin Latin Americaand the Caribbean) oroilexporting countries. Nevertheless, it is
possible that a numberofcountrieswhose currencies arenot currently peggedto European Union
currencies may decide to peg theircurrencies to theeuro. European Union countries that arenot
in the first wave ofEMUare likely to peg theircurrencies to the euro, as arecountries in therest
ofEurope who hope to become members ofthe European Union. It is less clear thatEuropean
countriesthat arenot currentlyprospective E.U. members, such as Switzerland and Norway will
adopta peg to the euro. The EuropeanUnion is the majortradingpartnerofthese tw’ countries.
It accounts for77 percent ofNorway’s exports and 79 percent ofSwitzerland’s exports.
Likewise, 71 percent ofNorway’s imports and 79 percent ofSwitzerland’s importscome from
the EuropeanUnion. These tradelinks alone may not cause these countriesto adopta peg to the
euro. Canada, forinstance, which sends 83 percent ofits exports to the UnitedStates, and
6receives 67 percent ofits imports from the U.S. hasnot felta need to peg its currencyto the U.S.
dollar.5
Anyeffect oftheincrease in the numberofcountriespegging theircurrencies to the euro
relativeto those peggingto the dollaron the European Union and the UnitedStates will occur
through theeffects ofthesepegson the use ofthe euro and dollar in otherfunctions. Countries,
forexample, that peg theircurrencies generallyhold most oftheirforeign exchange reserves in
the currencyto which they arepegged.
Reserve Currency
In 1975 thedollaraccounted for79 percent ofthe foreign currencyreserves held by the
member countriesofthe International MonetaryFund. The Deutschemarkhad a 6 percent share
offoreignexchange reserves and the pound sterling had a 4 percent share. Thecombined share
ofthe currencies ofthe currentmembers ofthe EuropeanUnion was 12 percent.6 The yen
accounted foronly 0.5 percent offoreigncurrencyreserves. In 1996 thedollar’s share of
international foreigncurrencyreserves had fallen to 64 percent, while the pound’sshare
remained steady at4 percent. Incontrast, the sharesforthe mark and the yen had risen to 14 and
6 percent, respectively. The share ofthe European Union currencies roseto 20 percent.
Figures la-id show theshares ofthe U.S. dollar, the Japaneseyen, theDeutsche mark,
and the combined share ofE.U. currencies in official holdings offoreignexchange since 1973.
~ Tradedata are for 1996 and are from the IMF (1997).
6 The only E.U. currencies forwhich data arereported are theDM, the French franc,
pound sterling and the Netherlands guilder.
7The decline in the dollar’s share in foreign exchange reserves occurredprimarily in the late 1970s
and early 1980s, as shown in Figure la. While there was a furtherdropin the dollar’s share in
the late l980s, since 1990 thedollar’s share hasrisen and now stands atclose to its share in
1985. The inverseofthese trends is noticeable in theothercharts.
These Figures also provideinformation on eachcurrency’s share in foreignexchange
reserves in the industrial and developing countries. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s the
developing countries always had more diversified holdings offoreign currencies than did the
industrial countries. Currently, however, the dollar’s share in the officialforeign currency
holdings is nearly identical in the developing and industrial countries. Developingcountries,
however, nowhold a much smaller share oftheirreserves in Deutsche marks than do the
industrial countries.7
The determinants ofthe currencycomposition ofreserves varies across developing and
industrial countries8. Inthe formertradeand financial links areimportantfactors. Reserves
remain importantforfinancing imports in developing countries,whereas in industrial countries
private markets generallyfulfill this role. Thus, the currencies in which imports are invoiced in
developing countries is a key determinantofthe composition ofreserves. It was generally
believed that the greater reserve diversification on the partofthe developingcountries was a
resultofthegreater importance ofreserves in financing trade.
~‘ Mostofthe Deutschemark reserves held by industrial countries are accounted forby
the EuropeanUnion countries. Data in Masson and Turtelboom(1997) indicate that the
EuropeanUnion countries held 69 percent oftheDeutsche markreserves heldby industrial
countries in 1995.
8 See Ben-Bassat (1980, 1984) and Dooley et al (1989).
8Reserves also areimportantforfinancing the foreigndebtofdeveloping countries. The
currency composition ofthis debtwill affect thecurrency compositionofthedemand for
reserves. As shown in Table 4, the long-term debtofdevelopingcountries is most commonly
denominated in U.S. dollars. Moreover, the percent ofdeveloping countrydebt denominated in
the currencies oTthe EuropeanUnion countries hasdeclined sharply since the l970s.
Nevertheless, thedollar’s share in the foreigncurrencyreservesofdevelopingcountries
outweighs its importance in financing debt.
Table 4
Currency Composition ofLong-term Debt in Developing Countries
(percent)
Currency 1970 1980 1990 1995
U.S. dollar 45.6 47.2 40.3 44.3
Japanese yen 2.2 5.8 9.9 11.6
Deutsche mark 8.6 6.4 8.6 7.3
French franc 5.3 5.3 5.4 4.5
Pound Sterling 11.6 3.3 2.2 1.4
All E.U. Currencies 25.5 15.0 16.2 13.2
Multiple Currencies 12.1 10.3 14.3 14.2
Source: World Bank, GlobalDevelopment Finance, 1997.
Inboth developing and industrial countries the exchange rate arrangement affects the
currencycomposition ofinternationalreserves. Heller and Knight (1978) provided an early
analysis ofthis effect. They showedthat if a countrypegged its exchange rateto a particular
currencythat currency’s share in its reserves rose. Dooley et al(1989) argued that for industrial
countries theexchange rate arrangement was themost importantdeterminantofthecomposition
ofinternationalreserves. Inparticular, countries with a flexibleexchange ratehad a high share
9ofdollarreserves and a low share ofDeutsche mark reserves. Theimportance ofthe exchange
rate arrangement in determiningthe currencycomposition ofa country’s reserves is linked to the
use ofthese reserves forintervening in the currency markets. This is discussedin thenext
section.
The risk~ and return on currencies is also a factorin determining the currencycomposition
ofreserves. Most reserves are heldin the formofgovernment securities. Thus, changes in the
relative return on these securities in conjunctionwith the depreciation risk, particularly if
sustained over a long-period maycause shifts in acountry’s composition ofreserves. In addition
the liquidityofgovernment securities markets is a factorin determiningthechoice ofreserve
currency since reserves may needto be sold quickly forinterventionpurposes.
Muchofthe focus on the effects ofthe creation oftheeuro on thecomposition of
internationalreserves has been on changes in reserve holdings that willoccur amongthe
members oftheEMU. Monetaryunion will havetwo effects on members reserves. First, any
holdings of thecurrencies ofthemembers ofthe monetary union will ceaseto be international
reserves. This will reduce total reserves and increase (at leastinitially) the dollar’s share in the
internationalreserves ofthe EMUcountries. Second, thepooling ofreserves willresult in a
declinein the need fortotal reserves, as willth~ reduction in theneedforreserves for
interventionpurposes.
A recent study indicates that ifall fifteen members ofthe European Unionjoin EMU,
total reserves ofthe member states will declinefrom $295.5 billion to $204.7 billion as a result
ofthe elimination ofthe reservestatus ofthe European Union currencies.9 This reduction, as
~ See Masson and Turtelboom (1997).
10noted above,will increase the dollar’s share in the reserves ofthesecountries. Evena further
reduction in the foreign exchange reserves ofthe membersofthe monetary union will leave the
dollar’s share offoreign exchange reserves aboveits currentshare. Only through a
diversification ofthe remaining reserves would the dollar’s share fall.
For the euro to rival the dollaras an international reservecurrency, non-EMU countries
willhave to significantly shift the portfolio composition oftheirreserves. While it is likely that
otherEuropeancountries mayshift some of theirreserves from dollars into euros, a pivotal shift
in the worldwide composition ofreserves will require majorchanges in the reservecomposition
on thepart ofLatin American and Asiancountries. Thereis no evidence that sucha large shift in
reserves will follow from thecreationoftheeuro. Chinaforexample, recentlyannouncedthat it
would not consider exchanging any ofits dollarreserves foreuro reserves until theeuro had
proven itself to be a “hard and stable currency afteryears ofrunning”.’°
Certainlyas the euro’s use an international medium ofexchange rises,countries are likely
to increase theirholdingofeuro reserves. These actionswill leadto gradual rather than sharp
shifts in thecomposition ofreserves.” This point is also made by Johnson (1994) who argues
that as long as the Federal Reserveachieves an acceptable degree ofpricestabilityin the United
States,changes in reserve holdings will remain gradual.
The implications ofa diversification ofinternationalreserves away from the U.S. dollar
and toward theeuro depend on the speed at which such a change would occur. A massive sale of
dollars by central banks and purchase ofeuros would cause a sharp dropin the value ofthe dollar
10 Harding (1997)
~l This point is made by Kenen (1993) page 265.
iirelative to the euro. Such a shift should also raise interest rates on U.S. government securities
since, as noted above,most reserves are heldin government securities. Incontrast, the euro
would temporarilyrise in value and interest ratein the EMUcountries would drop. However, the
general consensus is that any shift in reserves from dollars to euros is likely to occur gradually.’2
As notedabove, it is likely that the need forreserves on thepartofthe EMU member
countrieswill decline following thepoolingofreserves. While estimates ofexcess reserves in
theEuropean Union as a result ofmonetary union vary, these countriesare not likely to dump
thesereserves in currencymarkets. It is even possible that the EMUcountries will want to
maintain a large stock ofreserves forseveral years followingthe creationofthe euro to respond
to a possible currencycrisis.
A gradual shift in international reserves toward theeuro is unlikely to have much effect
on the United Statesorthe European Union. Becausenearly all international reserves are
invested in government securities, thereserve currency countrydoesnot gain any seignorage
benefits. The most importantbenefit is the possibility that reserve currencystatus lowersthe
interest rate atwhich thegovernment canborrow. Thus, it is arguedthat Europe will benefit
through a reduction in the interest rateat which governments can borrowwhile the U.S.
government willsee its borrowing costs rise.
A negative interest rateeffect on the U.S. would require not simply a rise in the share of
reserves held in euros but an absolute declinein holdings ofdollar reserves. Given the trends in
the growth ofworldwide reserves, the latterchange will take longer(ifever) to occur than the
former. In addition, the extentofthe interest ratebenefit to a reservecurrency is notwell-
12 One writer who has argued that the shift may be immediate is Bergsten (1997).
12established. Blinder (1996) is skeptical oftheimportance ofsucha link. He argues that ifsuch a
benefit were significant thenthere should be a largerdifference betweeninterest rates on
government and corporate bonds in the U.S. then in other majorcountries, yetfinds no evidence
to support this argument.
Intervention Currency
Acorollary to the dollar’srole as theprimaryinternational reservecurrency is its useas
the main currency forinterveningin foreignexchange markets. This latterrole is also aidedby
the use ofthe dollaras a vehiclecurrency and bythe liquidityofthe U.S. bond market, as
discussed later in this paper. Although dataon interventions are limited, it is believed that nearly
all intervention in the currencies markets, with theexception ofthose undertaken by the United
States, takes place in dollars. Another exception is within theERM, where mandatory
intervention must takeplace in the EMS currencies.’3 However, even here thedollar is often
usedforintra-band interventions. 14
The most important determinants ofthechoiceofinterventioncurrency are liquidity and
acceptability. Incountries thatpeg theirexchange rate, thecurrencypeg will determine the
interventioncurrency. Since countr:~s preferto hold theirreserves in the form of interest-
earningassets the liquidity ofthese assets is extremely important. The relativeilliquidity ofthe
13 Intervention is mandatory whena currency reaches the limits of its exchange rate
bands. However, intervention often occurs before a currencyreaches the limit.
‘~‘Giavazzi (1989)provides some evidence on the use ofthe dollaras an intervention
currency in the ERM in the 1980s.
13German and Japanese bond markets,gives the dollaran advantageover the use ofthese two
currencies.~
The acceptability of an international currency is related to its role as a medium of
exchange forprivate transactions. Themorefrequently a currency is usedforprivate transactions
the largeris th~• exchange market forthat currency, which increases theease with which a
countrycan usethecurrencyforinterventionpurposes.
The Private Uses ofan International Currency
Invoice Currency
The dollaris thepredominantinternational currency that serves a unit ofaccount function
forprivate transactions. The U.S. dollar is usedas theinvoice currencyforroughly 48 percent of
world exports, as shown in Table 5. The Deutsche mark is theinvoice currencyfor
approximately 15 percent ofworldexports, with the yen’s share far behind at 5 percent. In fact,
the French franc and thepound sterling are more oftenused to invoice tradethan is the yen.
The share ofthe U.S. dollaras an invoice currencyfar surpasses theshare ofany other
currency. However, thecombined shareofthe 5 majorcurrencies oftheEuropean Union, at 34
perce~, does comecloser to that ofthe dollar. Nevertheless, thereis a clear distinctionbetween
the useofthe dollar and otherinvoice currencies. Nearly all international trade that is not
invoiced in thecurrency ofone ofthe two trading partners is invoiced in U.S. dollars. Roughly
~ The existenceofswap arrangements between central bankscan offset some these
liquidity problems.
1425 percent of world tradedoes not involve the UnitedStates but is pricedin dollars.’6 In addition
a muchhigher percentageoftradeinvolving the UnitedStates is conducted in its own currency
than is true forothercountries. Forexample, about 80 percent ofU.S. imports are invoiced in
dollars, while 56 percent ofGermanimports areinvoiced in marks and 17 percentofJapanese
imports are invOiced in yen.’7
Table 5
Trade Invoiced in Major Currencies
(percent ofworld exports)
Currency 1980 1987 1992
U.S. dollar 56.1 47.9 47.6
Japanese yen 2.1 4.0 4.8
Deutsche mark 13.6 16.1 15.3
French franc 6.2 6.5 6.3
British pound 6.5 5.5 5.7
Italian lira 2.2 3.2 3.4
Netherlands guilder 2.6 2.8 2.8
E.U.-5’ 31.1 34.1 33.5
‘ E.U.-5 is the share ofthe five E.U. currencies listed in the
table. No data were available for the other E.U. currencies
Source: Hartmann(1996).
Studies on the invoicing ofworld traderevealed thefollowing patterns.’8 Tradein
manufacturedgoods among the industrial economies is most oftenpriced in the currencyofthe
exporter. Ifthe exporter’s currency is not used then the importer’s currency is the most frequent
16 Onereason forthe useofthe dollarin non-U.S. tradeis the dollarpricing of
internationally traded commodities.
17 Blinder (1996), page 132.
18 See for example Grassman (1973), Page (1981) andBlack (1990).
15choice. Only rarely is a third country’s currencyused. Tradebetweenindustrial and developing
countries is generallypricedin the currency ofthe industrial countryorthat ofa third country.
Tradebetweendeveloping countries is often pricedin the currencyofa thirdcountry. When a
third country’s currency is usedforinvoicing trade, the U.S. dollar is themost likely choice. The
limited use ofdeveloping countries’ currencies in world tradearose in partbecausemany of
these countriesrestricted (and some continue to restrict) theconvertibilityoftheircurrencies.
Tradein primarycommodities is almost always invoiced in U.S. dollars since theseproducts are
pricedin dollars on international exchanges.
Another factorin the choice ofan invoice currency is the expected stabilityofthe
currency. The share ofa country’s exports denominated in its domestic currencydeclines the
greater is the expected depreciation ofits currency.’9 Thus thecurrencies ofcountriesplagued
by inflation are seldom usedin international trade.
The creation oftheeuro should foster its useas an invoice currency. Replacing as many
as 15 currencies with a singlecurrencyreduces the transaction costs involved in currency
exchanges.2°The reduction in transactions costs will facilitate the useofthe euro by the smaller
EMU member countries who aremore likely to currently invoice theirexports to the U.S. in
dollars. In intra-European Union trade the useofthe dollaris negligible and so the cre~ion of
the euro will have no noticeable effect.2’
‘9See Black (1990)pages 185-86.
20 As Hartmann (1996) notes “a deepand broad foreignexchange market” is an
important determinant of the use of acurrency forinvoicing trade.
21 SeePage (1981) page 62.
16It is not obvious, however, that trade involving neither the E.U. northe U.S. that is
currently invoiced in dollars willbe invoiced in euros following the EMU. Nordoes it follow
that thepricing of internationally traded commodities will shift from dollars to euros, at leastnot
in the nearterm. The locationof majorcommodity exchangesin the United States, while not a
necessary requirementfordollarpricing, does increase the likelihood that these commodities will
continue to be pricedin dollars. While it is possible that an integratedEuropewill develop
commodityexchangesto rivalthose ofthe U.S. such a shift is likely to be gradual.Most
importantly, any shift in pricingofthese commodities is unlikely to occuruntil the stability of
Europe’s newmonetary system is well-established.
What effects will the use oftheeuro as an invoice currency haveon Europe and the
United States? Thebiggest gain is likely to come in thereduction in transactions costs when
trading in thecurrencies ofthe smaller EMU member states. However, suchgains will occur
even if the share oftheeuro in invoicing is no greater than thecurrentcombined shares ofthe
individual EMU member currencies. A rise in theshare ofEMU imports invoiced in euros may
reducethe exposure ofits importers to short-term exchange ratevariability. A decline in the
share ofU.S. imports invoiced in dollars would have theopposite effect. However, thereexist a
wide range ofoptions forimporters to hedgethe risk ofexchange ratechanges. More
importantly, thereis little evidence thatthe use ofa currencyforinvoicing tradereducesthe pass-
through ofexchange ratechanges on import prices.22
Aswitch from dollar to euro invoicing in internationaltrade not involving the U.S. or the
EMUcountries willhave no effect on either. Thus, a shift in international commoditypricing
22See Menon (1995) fora recent surveyofpass-through studies.
17from dollars to euros will affect the U.S. only to theextent that it increases the exposure ofU.S.
importers to exchange rate risk. The effect on the EMU countrieswill occurto the extent that
exchange raterisk is reduced. Theseeffects depend on the extent to which commodityprices are
less volatile in dollars than in European currencies. Emerson et al (1992) states that in the
medium to long-run thecurrencydenomination ofoil prices doesnot affect the real price ofoil.
However, they argue that because ofdifferences in short-run volatility theremay be advantages
to the EuropeanUnion from having oil priced in euros.
The ideathat the currency denomination ofoil pricesdoes not affect the realdomestic
currencyprice ofoil over time is supported by an examination ofthe data fortheUnitedStates
and Germany. The argument that the realpriceofoil in Deutsche marks (orany non-dollar
currency) is more volatile than thereal priceofoil in dollars is based on the ideathatexchange
rate fluctuations add anothersource ofvariability to theprice. That is, the real priceofoil in the
U.S. depends on the dollarpriceofoil in international markets and the U.S. inflationratewhile
the real priceofoil in Germany depends on the dollarpriceofoil in international markets, the
mark/dollar exchange rateand the German inflationrate. The evidence, however, indicates that
there is a negative covariancebetween theexchange rate and the inflationratewhich overtime
eliminates any increased variability from theexchange rate. The variances ofthe monthly real
priceofoil in dollars and in Deutschemarks overthe period January 1985 through August 1997
were virtually identical.23 Thus, a shift in oil pricing in international markets from dollars to
euros will not reduce thevariability ofthereal price ofoil in European markets.
23 AnF-test indicatedthat the probability that the variances ofthe two oil priceseries
were different was less than .01 percent.
18Financial Assets
In international financial marketsthe dollaris the currencyofchoice, although once again
currencydiversification is rising. In the 1950s over three-quarters ofthe fundsraised on
financial markets were denominated in dollars, as shown in Table 6. The pound sterling wasthe
second most pdpularcurrency, accounting for 8 percent ofinternational capitalmarket issues,
and nearly 70 percentofthe funds raised in the currencies ofthe currentEuropean Union
members. The Swiss franc was thethird most popularcurrency, accounting for7 percent of
internationalcapital market issues. Almost 94 percent ofthefunds raised on internationalcapital
markets were denominated in these threecurrencies. The yen wasnot usedat all in international
financial markets in the l950s and only 2 percent of fundsraised in international marketswere in
Deutsche marks.
Currency 1950-59 1960-69 1970-79 1980-89 1990-95
U.S. dollar 78.2 69.9 76.5 63.1 50.5
Japanese yen 00 2.3 7.3 10.0
Swiss franc 7.1 5.4 7.2 6.6 4.0
Deutsche mark 2.0 16.3 8.6 5.3 7.8
Pound sterling 8.3 2.9 1.0 6.9 7.2
Total E.U.2 11.9 22.6 12.3 18.4 30.2
In the 1990s half the fundsraised on international financial markets were denominated in
dollars and 30 percent were denominated in EuropeanUnion currencies with the Deutsche mark
Table 6
Funds Raisedon International Markets’ -- By CurrencyofIssue
(percent)
l Fundsraised in international markets include international bond issues (foreign
bonds and Euro-bonds), syndicated loans, and other debt facilities.
2. Total E.U. includes all current E.U. currencies and currencycomposites, such as
the ecu.
Source: OECD, International Capital Market Statistics, 1996.
19beingusedonly slightly moreoften than the pound. The yen’s share rose to 10 percent while the
share ofthe Swiss franc fell to 4 percent.
Table 7 provides informationon theuseofcurrencies in international bond markets. In
these markets the share ofthedollar hasdeclinedby half since the l950s while theshare ofthe
yen and theEuropean Union currencies haverisen substantially. Nonetheless, with the exception
ofthe rise in the useofthe yen, the trends have not been smooth,
Inforeignbond issues,the use ofthe Swiss franchas grown to rival the use ofthe dollar.
In the l980s the Swiss franc wasclearly thecurrencyofchoice forforeignbond issues, with its
sharing beingmore than doublethat ofthe dollar. The share ofthe European Union currencies
peaked in the l960s. The decline in the useofthe mark sincethe l960s is particularly
noteworthy. So far this decade, no foreignbonds havebeen issued in Deutsche marks.
IntheEuro-bond market it is theEuropeanUnion currencies that currently rival the
dollar. While the dollarhashistorically held the majorshareofthis market, in the l990s its share
is slightlybelow that ofthe E.U. currencies. The mark currently accounts forslightly more than
one-third ofthe combined share ofthe European Union currencies, but its importance is
declining as a result ofa sharp increase in French franc Euro-bond issues (the franc’s share in the
E.U. currencies rose from 5 percent in the l980s tc’ 18 percent in the 1990s) and theentry into the
Euro-bond market ofthe lesser E.U. currencies. The Swiss franc is rarely usedin Euro-bond
issues in contrastto its strong presencein theforeignbond market.
In contrastto the trends in international bond markets,the dollar remainsthe clear
currencyofchoice in the syndicated loans market, as Table 8 indicates. The share ofthe
Japanese yen rose to nearly 7 percent in the l980s but has fallen to less than 1 percent in the
1990s. Neither the Swiss franc northe Deutschemark are usedfrequently in international
20syndicated bank lending. Thepound is thepredominantEuropean currencyusedin syndicated
lending.
Table 7
Funds Raised in International Bond Markets
By Currency ofIssue
(percent)
Currency 1950-59 I 1960-69 I 1970-79 I 1980-89 I 1990-96
Total Bonds
U.S. dollar 78.2 69.9 49.2 50.7 36.6
Japanese yen 0.0 0.0 5.2 8.9 14.8
Swiss franc 7.1 5.4 17.5 11.4 6.0
Deutsche mark 2.0 16.3 17.9 8.0 10.3
Pound sterling 8.3 2.9 0.6 6.4 7.4
Total E.U.’ 11.9 23.4 24.8 22.6 36.5
ForeignBonds
U.S. dollar 78.2 65.1 42.2 19.7 32.9
Japanese yen 0.0 0.0 9.5 14.6 19.3
Swiss franc 7.1 8.5 33.4 50.1 30.9
Deutsche mark 2.0 16.4 8.3 4.7 0.0
Pound sterling 8.3 2.3 0.2 2.3 0.1
TotalE.U.’ 11.9 25.3 13.2 15.3 16.7
Euro Bonds
U.S. dollar -- 77.9 56.1 59.7 39.6
Japanese yen -- 0 0.4 7.5 12.7
Swiss franc -- 00 0.01 0
Deutsche mark -- 17.8 28.4 9.0 13.6
Pound sterling -- 1.6 1.1 7.6 8.9
Total E.U.’ -- 22.1 37.5 24.7 41.2
Total E.U. includes all current E.U. currencies and currencycomposites, such as the
ecu.
Source: OECD,International Capital MarketStatistics, 1996 and FinancialStatistics
Monthly,June 1997.
21Currency 1950-59 1960-69 1970-79 1980-89 1990-95
U.S. dollar -- -- 95.3 76.1 78.9
Japanese yen -- -- 0.3 6.8 0.8
Swiss franc -- -- 0.1 0.6 0.2
Deutschemark -- -- 2.1 2.2 3.2
Poundsterling -- -- 1.3 7.5 7.1
TotalE.U.’ -- -- 3.7 13.9 19.1
Total E.U. includes all current E.U. currencies and currencycomposites,such as the
ecu.
Source: OECD, International Capital Market Statistics.
Inother bankfacilities thedollar dominance is most obvious. As shown in Table 9, 91
percent ofthesedebtfacilities aremadein dollars. The pound is the only othercurrencythat
plays a significant role in this market, accounting for4 percentoftotal issues and two-thirds of
the issues in European currencies.
Table 9
Other Debt Facilities in International Markets’
By CurrencyofIssue
(percent)
Currency 1950-59 1960-69 1970-79 1980-89 1990-95
U.S. dollar -- -- -- 88.9 91.0
Japanese yen -- -- -- 0.02 0
Swiss franc -- -- -- 0.01 0.1
Deutschemark -- -- -- 0.09 0
Pound sterling -- -- -- 7.5 3.9
Total E.U.’ -- -- -- 9.4 5.9
Table 8
International SyndicatedLoans -- By Currency ofIssue
(percent)
I Includes othermedium-term bankfacilities such as underwritten facilities to back
up the issue of other financial instruments as well asprecautionaiy credit lines
arranged in thecontext oftake-overbids.
2Total E.U. includes all current E.U. currencies and currencycomposites, such as the
ecu.
Source: OECD, International Capital MarketStatistics.
22The declinein the dollar’sdominance in worldcapital markets,reflected in these tables,
is a resultoftheemergence ofotherstrong economies that in conjunction with the liberalization
and deregulation offinancial systems worldwide has increased the attractiveness ofassets
denominatedin other currencies. This is particularly evident in the bond markets where there has
been a rapid increase in thenumberofcurrencies used.
The use ofa country’s currency in international capitalmarkets is determinedby the size,
openness and liquidity of that country’s financial marketsand the stabilityofits currency. All
but the last ofthese factorsfavor the U.S. dollarover the Japanese yen and Europeancurrencies.
European and Japanese markets aresegmented relative to the U.S. market. While worldwide
capital markets are becoming more open and integratedleading to an increased use ofcurrencies
other than thedollarin capital transactions, the U.S. market still leads theworld in size and
liquidity.
With the establishment ofa single currencyin theEuropean Union the valueofprivate
assets denominatedin euros will rival the sizeofthe U.S. capital market.24 However, the
creation ofthe euro alone will not ensure that this market becomes integratedormore liquid.
The creation ofthe euro will increase therange ofassets in theEuropean Union that are
denominated in a singlecurrency. This in”~ease in the depth ofthe Europeanfinancial market
should increase its attractiveness to international investors. The establishment ofa common
24 Ifall the EuropeanUnion countriesjoin the EMUthe size ofthe Europeancapital
market will exceed the U.S. capital market. According to Prati and Schinasi (1997), the market
value ofequities, bonds and bank assets issued by E.U. countries as ofthe end of 1995 was $27
trillion while the market value ofcomparable U.S. issued assets was $23 trillion..
23system forsettling inter-bank payments should aid in thedevelopment ofa more liquid market
furtherincreasing its attractiveness.
Theestablishment ofthe euro will also reducebarriers to cross borderinvestment among
themembers ofthe monetary union. Forexample, insurance companies and some pension funds
withinthe Eurtypean Union arerestricted in theirability to issue internationaldebt. Liabilities in
a foreigncurrency must be 80 percent matchedby assetsin that same currency. With the creation
ofthe euro this matchingrule will be irrelevantforintra-EMU investments.
Despite theseboostsfora more integrated, liquid and thick capital market from the
creation ofthe euro, there will remain limitations on theEuropeancapital market. Currently, as
Prati and Schinasi (1997)note, the Europeanmarkets fordebt and equity securities retain
distinctly national orientations. The establishment ofa singlecurrencywill not end these
distinctions. Furthermore, while some writers note that the government bond market in a full-
membership EMU willequal thesize ofthe U.S. government bond market, thereis a key
distinction. In the U.S. thereis a single issuer -- the U.S. Treasury. The European government
bond market under EMUwill be moresimilar to the bond markets forthe U.S. states, both in
terms ofthe existence ofrisk difference amongissuers and the lackofa wholly integrated
market.
In theUnited States, theFederal Reservealso plays a role in promoting theliquidityof
the government bond market. Prati and Schinasi (1997) argue that the use ofopen market
operations as the primary toolofmonetary policy by theFederal Reserve “has fostered the
developmentofefficient moneyand securities markets in theUnited States.” Whereas, the
infrequent interventions by European central banks in securities markets “has tended to
discourage thedevelopment ofprivate securities markets and foster the predominanceofbank-
24intermediated finance.”25 The extent to which this occurs in Europedepends on the still to be
finalizedoperating proceduresofthe EuropeanCentral Bank. The currentproposal, however,
does not differmuch from the currentoperating procedures ofthemajorEuropean central
banks.26
The eurb willprovide an opportunityforthe developmentofa Europeancapital market to
rival the advantages ofthe U.S. market, butitdoes not guarantee the creationofsuch a market.
The movement to acommon currencyshould give an initial boost to Europeancapital markets
but it is not likely to cause significant shifts in the currencycomposition of private portfolios.
Given the uncertainty likely to surround the euro in its earlyyears, it is evenpossible that there
maybe an initial shift ofprivate portfolios away from euros toward the dollar orothernon-EMU
Europeanasset markets, such as Switzerland.27
Vehicle Currency
Currently, the dollaris by far theprimaryinternational medium ofexchange. While there
is no direct dataon vehiclecurrencies, this information can be gleaned from the shares of
currencies in all foreignexchange transactions. As shown in Table 10, thedollar is involved in
25 Prati and Schinasi (1997), pp. 16-17. Prati and Schinasi argue that the daily Fed
interventions in thesecurities marketsoccurs not simplyfrom a monetary policy objectivebut the
desire to promote “thesmooth functioning and stabilityoffinancial markets.”
26Prati and Schinasi (1997), page 17.
27 Laxton and Prasad (1997) examine the implications ofa shift away from E.U. assets to
Swiss assets as a result ofuncertainty surrounding the EMU.
2583 percentofall currencyexchanges.28 The Deutsche mark is the second most frequently traded
currency, appearing in 36 percent ofall exchanges. The yen is the third most frequently traded
currency taking part in 24 percent ofall currency trades. Nevertheless the yen rarely serves as a
vehiclecurrencyas 88 percent ofall ofthesetrades arewith the dollar.29 Thedollarand the
Deutsche mark ‘arethe only currencies that are “traded in largequantities against awide range of
other currencies.”30 The dollar’s dominance is especiallyclearin forwardand swaptransactions.
The dollaris involved in 79 percent ofall forward tradescompared to the Deutsche mark’s and
yen’s shares of31 of29 percent, respectively. In swaps the contrastis even greater. Thedollar is
involved in 95 percent ofall swaps, with the Deutschemark and yen taking part in 21 and 25
percent, respectively, ofall trades,.
Table 10
















Spot 71 22 54 98 1 3 84
Forwards 79 29 31 10 7 17 66
Swaps 95 25 21 9 8 19 56 -
69 Total 83 24 36 98 1 5
1. All E.U. includes thecurrencies ofthe 15 membersof the European Union and the ecu.
Source: Bankfor International Settlements, CentralBank SurveyofForeign Exchangeand Derivatives Market
Activity 1995, Basle: May 1996, Table 1-A.
28 Since there are always two currencies involved in an exchange thetotal share ofall
currencies tradedon international exchanges will equal 200 percent. However, a single currency
can at most be involved in 100 percent ofall exchanges.
29 Incontrast, 56 percentofall trades involving the Deutsche mark arewith the dollar.
30 Bank for International Settlements (1996).
26In the spot market, the total share oftheEuropean Union currencies exceeds that ofthe
dollar. However, muchofthis activity involves intra-E.U. currencytrades which will disappear
afterthe creationofthe euro. In the forwardand swap markets the E.U. currencies areused less
frequently than thedollar, but maintain an notable presence.
The emergence ofa currencyas a vehicle currency is determined primarilyby
transactions costs. Transactions costs areinversely proportional to volume in eachbilateral
currency market.3’ This volume, is in turn determinedby a currency’s share in international trade
and capital flows.Thus, the useofa currencyin invoicing international trade, in international
capital markets and as a reserve currencyall lower the transactions costs associated with the use
ofthat currency.
A vehicle currencyemerges wheneverthe indirectexchange costs through the vehicleare
less than direct exchange costs betweentwo non-vehiclecurrencies. Forexample, given the
depth ofthe exchange market fordollars itmaybe less costly to exchange Mexicanpesos for
U.S. dollars and then exchange U.S. dollarsforMalaysian ringgit then to exchange pesos directly
forringgits. Indeed, theexistenceoftransaction costs may reinforce the useofthe dollar as an
invoice currency.
Theextent ofliquidity in asset markets also affects the developmentof a vehicle
currency. Banks, like countries,prefer to hold most oftheirforeigncurrencies in the form of
interest-earning assets ratherthan cash. The liquidityofthese assets is a key determinantofthe
transactions costs involved in switching from one currency to another. Liquidity is determined
~ The useoftransactions cost theory to explain the rise ofa vehicle currency was
developed by Krugman (1980) and Chrystal (1984).
27not simply by thesize ofa country’s capital markets but by the depthofits markets, i.e. the
extent to which secondary marketsoperate.
The prospects ofthe euro becoming an importantvehicle currencythus dependprimarily
on thetransactions costs associated with euro exchanges. Clearly the size oftheeuro market
relative to themarkets forindividualE.U. currencies will result in lower relative transactions
costs forthe euro. These transactions costs will also depend on the extent to which theeuro is
adoptedas an invoice currency, a reserve currency,and its use in international capitalmarkets.
Since any changes in these usesare expected to occur gradually, the use ofthe euro as a vehicle
currencyshould also occur gradually.
Initially the developmentoftheeuro is apt to increase theuseofthedollar as a vehicle
currency regardlessofthe policy environmentsurrounding theeuro’s development. This is
becausethe euro willeliminate intra-EMU trading. Table 11 looks atthe useofcurrencies in
foreign exchange market transactions excluding the transactions between the Deutsche mark and
other EuropeanUnion currencies (including ecus). Although dataon intra-Europeancurrency
transactions not involving the Deutsche markarenot available, the numbers in Table 11 provide
a rough estimateofthe initial effects ofthecreation ofthe euro on currencytrades. The shares of
the Europeancurrencies fall whilethose ofthedollarand the yen rise, most notably in the spot
market. Accountingforall intra-E.U. currencytrades will furtherraise theshares ofthedollar
and the yen. The euro, however, willbe the second most frequently tradedcurrency with a share
well above that ofthe yen.
Unless markets become highly segmented, as arguedby those who foresee the
developmentof a bipolar(euro/dollar) ortripolar (euro/dollar/yen) world, the transactions costs
from the use of a primaryvehicle currency, ratherthan competingvehiclecurrencies, are likely to
28be lowest. It is more likely that a periodofmultiple vehiclecurrencies would give wayto a new
primaryvehiclecurrency, much the sameway as the dollarsuperseded thepound as theprimary
vehicle currency. Such an change,however, willnot come aboutsimplybecauseofthe creation
ofa singlecurrency, orevenbecause ofthe furtherintegration ofEuropeancapital markets.
Thus, while in the medium-termthe useoftheeuro as a vehiclecurrencyshould surpass the















Spot 85 26 45 737 6 1
Forwards 85 31 26 9 6 14 56
Swaps 97 26 19 9 7 18 53
Total 91 26 30 8 5 13 56
Substitution Currency
Another role that an international currency mayplay is a substitute fordomestic currency
transactions. Uncertainty surrounding thepurchasing powerofa domestic currencycan lead to
theuse ofa foreign currency as a unit ofaccount, store of value and medium ofexchange in the
Table 11
ForeignExchange Market-- Excluding Deutsche markfE.U.Currency Transactions
(Percentoftotal)
April 1995
1. All E.U. includes thecurrencies ofthe 15 membersofthe European Union and theECU.
Source: Author’s estimates using data from Bankfor International Settlements, Central Bank Survey ofForeign
Exchange and Derivatives MarketActivity 1995, Basle: May 1996, Tables 1-A and 1-C.
29domestic economy. This generallyoccurs as a resultof hyper-inflationand/or political instability.
Thedollarand the Deutsche markare the only currencies that are usedextensively
outsidetheirborders,with the dollarbeing thepredominate substitution currency. In part the
predominanceofthedollar is a resultofthe links betweenthe United States and countries using a
substitute currency. Nevertheless, the easewith which the dollaris available, which is
determinedby its other uses as an international currency, facilitates the useofthedollaras a
substitute currency.
Measures ofthe extent to which the dollarand the mark are usedas substitute currencies
are not easily obtained. However, thebest estimates indicate that 55 to 70 percent oftheU.S.
currency stock is held outside thecountry while 35 percent ofDeutschemarkholdings are
abroad.32
The use ofthe dollaras a substitute currencyprovides a direct benefit to the Untied States
through seignorage earnings. Figure 2 provides a roughestimateofthe real seignorageearnedby
the U.S. as a result offoreign holdings ofU.S. currency during the period l973-l996.~~ Inreal
terms seignoragerevenues have averaged $6.9 billion over the24 year period.
The seignorage benefits must be weighed againsttheproblems the foreignholdings of
currencycreate for monetary policy. As Porter and Jw”on (1996)note if foreigndemand fora
country’s currency is unrelated to domestic demand, then the interpretationofmovements in
monetary aggregates becomes moredifficult. While thepersistence ofhyperinflation and
32 Porter and Judson (1996). These dataare solelyfor cash and exclude dollaror
Deutsche markdenominated assetsordemand deposits held abroad.
~ These seignorage revenuesareestimated using theinterest rate on 3-month Treasury
bills and adjusting nominal revenues using the GDP deflator.
30political instability throughout the world hassustained the use ofthedollar as a substitute
currency,foreign demandis difficultto predict.
Theeuro is not likely to rapidly replacethe dollaras the substitute currencyofchoice. In
fact, theuse ofthe euro as a substitute currencyis likely to lag behindits use as an international
currency. Foreign holders ofa substitute currency want a stable, securecurrency. Uncertainty
surroundingthe euro and indeed themonetary union itselfwill limit the attractiveness ofthe
euro. Furthermore,given the monetary control problemscaused by theuse ofa currencyoutside
its borders, the newEuropeanCentral Bank maybe reluctantto promotethe use oftheeuro as a
substitute currency in the early years ofthe monetary union.
Inthe medium to long-term, however, theeuro is the natural substitute currency foruse
throughoutEurope. It may also become used more frequently in the MiddleEast but the euro is
not likely to replacethe dollaras the substitute currency in Latin America.
31
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I I I III III III I III II III II IThe useofthe euro as a substitute currencywill raise the seignorage earnings ofthe ECB.
It is difficultto predict how large these revenues might be astheydepend on the world demand
for substitute currencies, the shares ofthe euro and the dollar,and interest rateconditions.
Emersonet al (1992) estimatedthat theseseignorage revenues would atmost amount to $2.5
billion a year forthe ECB.
The effect on the seignoragerevenues oftheFederalReserve also dependon the three
factorsmentioned above. Iftheworlddemand forsubstitute currencies rises seignoragerevenues
forboth theEuropean and U.S. central banks could rise. The unpredictabilityofthedemand for
a substitute currencymakesitdifficultto count on seignorage fromthese earnings as a sourceof
revenue.
Conclusion
The use of a country’s currencyas an internationalcurrency is determinedby the size and
openness ofits economy and financial markets as well as its macroeconomic policy environment.
A low inflationaryenvironmentpromotes high growth and a stablecurrency. In the post-war
period thesefactors have favored theuseofthe U.S. dollar as the predominant international
currency. The emergence ofother strong economies, particularly Germany and Japan, however,
has reduced the dominanceofthe dollar. The dollarmay still be thecurrency ofchoice in
international markets but it is not the only choice.
The impending creation oftheeuro as the single currency fortheEuropean Union will
have a certain effect on international markets. Iftheeuro is adoptedby all fifteen members ofthe
European Union it will serve an economy nearly aslarge as the United States, with a European
Central Bank committed to maintaining a low inflationenvironment.
32Initially, however, the emergenceofthe euro is likely to increase the dollar’s role in
international markets. First, from an accounting viewpoint, the replacement of the currencies of
the EuropeanUnion with a singlecurrencywill eliminate the useofthesecurrencies asforeign
reserves forthe members ofthe monetary union and will eliminate foreigncurrencytransactions
in intra-E.U.currencies. The formerwillraise the dollar’sshare in internationalreserves and the
latterwill raisethe dollar’s share offoreigncurrencytransactions. Second, uncertainty
surroundingthe euro will favor the useofthe dollarin internationalmarkets. The policies ofthe
Europeangovernments and theEuropean centralbank are themost important factors in
determiningthe extent ofthis uncertainty. Concerns aboutthe attachmentofEuropean
governmentsand the public to monetary union willundermine the use oftheeuro in international
markets. Amonetary union fraughtwith conflict will be detrimentalto the use ofthe euro.
The useofthe euro as an internationalcurrency, and indeedthe rateat which theeuro
becomes adoptedforinternational transactions will also be affectedby the decision ofthe United
Kingdom tojoinoropt-out ofmonetary union. The internationalroleofthepound sterling has
diminished in the post-warera but the pound is still a key currencyin private financial market
transactions. Furthermore, therole ofLondon as a major financialcenter will providebenefits to
the euro. The inclusion ofthe U.K. in amor~tary union should boost the internationalpresence
ofthe euro.
While the short-term outlookfortheeuro is uncertain in the medium to long-term its use
as an internationalcurrency willsurely increase. One factin determining thelong-run useofthe
euro is thedevelopment ofa highly integrated, liquid European financialmarket. This will not
only increase the use ofthe euro forprivate financial transactions but also aid its use as a reserve
currencyand even as a vehiclecurrency.
33Nevertheless, the decline in thedollar’s share and therise is in the euro’s share in
international transactions is likely to occurgradually. In part this is because the more often a
currency is used in international transactions the lower are thecosts associated with using that
currencyand hence the more attractive is thecurrencyforconducting international exchanges.
Thus, there is much inertia in the choice of an international currency.
The ultimate determinants ofthecontinued useofthe dollar as an international currency
are the economicpolicies and conditions in the United States. As the Deputy Secretaryofthe
U.S. Treasury, Larry Summers noted “In the end, thedollar’s relative standing in the
international financial system will always dependmoreon developments here than on events
overseas.”34 In theabsence ofan economic crisis in theUnited States, the dollaris not likely to
lose its standing as the most popularinternational currency.
Any shifts in the roles of thedollar andeuro will affect both the UntiedStates and the
EuropeanUnion. The extent to which acountrybenefits from havingits currencyused
internationally is not clear. The use ofa currency forinvoicing may reduce the costs bone by that
country’s importers, although thesecosts maybe small at best. The use ofa currencyas a reserve
currencymayreduce the borrowingcosts ofthat country’s government, but again theextent of
this benefit is not known. The use ofa currencyas a substitute currencydoes provide seignorage
benefitsbut also complicates monetary policy.
As long asthe shift in the internationalrole ofthedollar is gradual the U.S. is unlikely to
be negativelyaffected. Moreover, thecreation ofa monetary union in Europe has the potential to
producebenefits to both the United Statesand the European Union which couldfar outweigh the
~ Summers (1997).
34effects ofshifts in international currencyholdings. Developments in European financial markets
aloneshould increase theinvestmentoptions available to consumers as well as reducethecosts
ofborrowing for businesses. These developments will benefit those on both sides ofthe
Atlantic.
35References
Bank for International Settlements. CentralBank SurveyofForeign Exchange and Derivatives
MarketActivity 1995, Basle: May 1996.
Ben-Bassat, Avraham, “The Optimal Composition ofForeign Exchange Reserves,” Journalof
InternationalEconomics, vol. 10 (May 1980), pp. 285-95.
,“Reserve-Currency Diversification and the Substitution Account,”Princeton Studiesin
InternationalFinance, # 53, 1984.
Bergsten, C. Fred. “TheDollar and the Euro,” ForeignAffairs, vol. 76, (July/August 1997), pp.
83-95.
Black, Stanley W. “TheInternational Use ofCurrencies,” in Yoshi Suzuki, Junichi Miyake and
Mitsuaki Okabe, eds., The EvolutionoftheInternationalMonetary System. Tokyo:
UniversityofTokyo Press, 1990.
Blinder , Alan S. “TheRole ofthe Dollar as an International Currency,”Eastern Economic
Journal, vol 22 (Spring 1996), pp. 127-36.
Chrystal, K. Alec. “On theTheoryofInternational Money,” in JohnBlack and GraemeS.
Dorrance, eds., ProblemsofInternationalFinance. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1984.
Cohen, B.J., The Future ofSterling as an International Currency. London: Macmillian Press,
1971.
Dooley, Michael P., J. Saul Lizondo and Donald J.Mathieson. “TheCurrencyComposition of
Foreign Exchange Reserves,”IMF StaffPapers, vol. 36, (June 1989), pp. 385-434.
Emerson, Michael, Daniel Gros, AlexanderItalianer, Jean Pisani-Ferry and Horst Reichenbach.
OneMarket, OneMoney. Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress, 1992.
Giavazzi, Francesco. “TheEuropeanMonetary System: Lessons from Europe and Perspectives in
Europe,” The EconomicandSocial Review, vol. 20 (January 1989), pp. 73-90.
Grassman, S. “AFundamental Symmetry in International Payments Patterns,”Journal of
InternationalEconomics, vol. 3, pp. 105-16.
Harding, James. “Foreign Exchange Reserves: Beijing Will Not Convert to ‘Soft Euro’,”
Financial Times, October 13, 1997.
Hartmann, Philipp. “The Future ofthe Euro as an International Currency: ATransactions
Perspective,” London School ofEconomics, FinancialMarkets Group Special Papers,
November 1996.
36Heller, H. Robertand MalcomKnight. “Reserve-CurrencyPreferences ofCentral Banks,”
Princeton Essays in InternationalFinance, #131, (December 1978).
International Monetary Fund,Direction of TradeStatistics Yearbook1996, Washington: IMF,
1997.
International Monetary Fund,Exchange Arrangementsand Exchange Restrictions, Annual
Report 1996. Washington: IMF, 1996.
Johnson, Karen H. “International Dimension ofEuropean Monetary Union: Implications forthe
Dollar,” Board ofGovernorsofthe FederalReserve System, InternationalFinancial
DiscussionPapers,# 469, May 1994.
Kenen, Peter B. “EMU,Exchange Rates and the International Monetary System,”Rescherches
Economiquesde Louvain, vol. 59 (1993),pp. 257-81.
Krugman, Paul. “VehicleCurrencies and the Structure ofInternational Exchange,”Journalof
Money, Credit and Banking, vol. 12, August 1980, pp. 5 13-26.
Laxton, Douglas and EswarPrasad. “Possible EffectsofEuropean Monetary Union on
Switzerland: ACase Study ofPolicy Dilemmas Caused by Low Inflation and the
Nominal InterestRate Floor,” IMF Working Paper# 97/23, March 1997.
Masson, Paul R. and BartG. Turtelboom. “Characteristic ofthe Euro, the demandforReserves,
and PolicyCoordination UnderEMU,” JMFWorking Paper # 97/58, May 1997.
Menon, Jayant. “Exchange Rate Pass-Through,”JournalofEconomic Surveys, vol.9 (June,
1995) pp. 197-231.
OECD, International CapitalMarketStatistics 1950-1995, Paris: OECD, 1996
OECD, Financial Statistics Monthly, Section 1, Paris: OECD, June 1997.
Page, 5. “TheChoice ofInvoicing Currencyin Merchandise Trade,” National Institute
EconomicReview, vol 85, pp. 60-72.
Porter, Richard D. And Ruth A. Judson. “The LocationofU.S. Currency: How Muchis
Abroad?,” FederalReserveBulletin, vol. 82 (October 1996), pp. 883-903.
Prati, Alessandro and Garry J. Schinasi, “European Monetary Union and International Capital
Markets: Structural Implications and Risks,” IMF Working Paper# 97/62, May 1997.
Summers, Larry H. TestimonyBefore theSenate BudgetCommittee, October21, 1997.
World Bank, Global DevelopmentFinance, volume 1, Washington: IBRD, 1997.
37Figure la






IIIIII I I 11 II IIIIII IIIII
1973 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 1996
Figure lb








1973 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 1996Figure ic





















III I 1 I IF~ F~I II T~I~ III II III
1973 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 1996
Developing countries
/
I II III IIII I IIII II I
197374 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 951996